

Message Text

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SUBJECT: OCT. 17 PRESS ROUNDUP

BELGRADE FOR USDEL CSCE

1. RICHARD BURT OF NEW YORK TIMES REPORTED THAT CARTER
ADMINISTRATION, "REACTING TO GROWING CONCERN IN CONGRESS
AND DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT OVER OUTLINES OF NEW SOVIET-
AMERICAN ACCORD LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS, HAS BEGUN TO MOUNT
STRONG DEFENSE OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT." WRITING IN OCT. 16
TIMES, BURT QUOTED HIGH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL AS SAYING
THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT MEETS MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF WHITE HOUSE
FOR ARMS CONTROL. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL, ACCORDING TO
BURT, SAID IT REPRESENTS "MUCH BETTER DEAL" THAN 1972 SALT
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AGREEMENT AND 1974 VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD. BURT SAID "U.S.
CONGRESS AND LOWER LEVELS OF BUREAUCRACY ARE ONLY NOW BEING
BRIEFED ON DETAILS, BUT SEVERAL ASPECTS OF UNDERSTANDING
HAVE ALREADY AROUSED CONTROVERSY. ONE PRINCIPAL QUESTION
BEING RAISED IS WHETHER PROPOSED LIMITS ON NEW GENERATION
OF SOVIET LAND-BASED MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRV'S ARE ADE-
QUATE TO SAFEGUARD COUNTRY AGAINST NUCLEAR ATTACK. CARTER
ADMINISTRATION, LIKE PREVIOUS ONES, VIEWS AN ARMS AGREEMENT
AS CENTERPIECE OF U.S. - USSR RELATIONS, AND FAILURE TO GAIN
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OR WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SUPPORT WOULD

CONSTITUTE MAJOR BLOW TO ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL, DEFENDING TERMS OF UNDERSTANDING, SAID THAT IT HAD SUCCEEDED IN ACHIEVING THREE PRIMARY GOALS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION SET BY ADMINISTRATION: PROVIDING EACH SIDE WITH EQUAL BUT LOWER NUMBERS OF FORCES, SLOWING DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW WEAPONS, AND ACCOMMODATING SPECIAL U.S. STRATEGIC CONCERNS REDUCING VULNERABILITY OF AMERICAN MINUTEMAN LAND-BASED MISSILES TO SOVIET ROCKET ATTACK DURING 1980'S. OFFICIAL SAID 1972 ARMS ACCORD WAS BASICALLY AN ASYMMETRICAL AGREEMENT BECAUSE IT GAVE SOVIET UNION 40 PERCENT ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS OF LAND AND SEA-BASED MISSILES. THIS WAS CORRECTED IN 1974 VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, OFFICIAL NOTED, BUT FORD-BREZHNEV UNDERSTANDING FAILED TO PLACE ANY SIGNIFICANT LIMITS ON WEAPON MODERNIZATION. ALSO, IN ALLOWING SOVIET UNION TO DEPLOY AS MANY AS 1,320 MIRV-EQUIPPED MISSILES, HE SAID, U.S. MINUTEMAN FORCE WOULD HAVE BEEN RENDERED HIGHLY VULNERABLE. ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES THAT AGREEMENT NOW UNDER DISCUSSION WOULD CORRECT THESE DEFICIENCIES. BOTH SIDES' FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED TO AN EQUAL LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 2,200 AND THREE-YEAR LIMITS WOULD BE PLACED ON WEAPONS MODERNIZATION. MORE IMPORTANTLY, IN PUTTING SEPARATE UNCLASSIFIED

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CEILING OF ABOUT 800 ON NUMBERS OF LAND-BASED MISSILES WITH MIRV'S, OFFICIAL SAID, AGREEMENT WOULD ENHANCE PROSPECTS OF SURVIVAL FOR LAND-BASED U.S. MISSILES. WILLINGNESS OF MOSCOW TO CONSIDER LIMITS ON NUMBERS OF MIRV-EQUIPPED LAND-BASED MISSILES APPARENTLY CONSTITUTED, IN ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW, CHIEF NEGOTIATING BREAKTHROUGH DURING GROMYKO VISIT."

2. HENRY BRADSHER, WRITING IN OCT. 16 WASHINGTON STAR, SAID TENTATIVE SALT AGREEMENT DOES NOT "BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OF MORE DEADLY WEAPONS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MADE KEY TO HIS REVISED APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL." AS IT NOW STANDS, BRADSHER POINTED OUT, TENTATIVE TREATY'S AUTHORIZATION FOR MODERNIZATION WOULD PERMIT PENTAGON TO CONTINUE IMPROVING ACCURACY OF ITS MISSILE WARHEADS. IT MIGHT ALSO PERMIT DEVELOPMENT OF STRETCH VERSION OF SUPERSONIC FB-111 BOMBER AS SUBSTITUTE FOR B-ONE. IT WOULD PERMIT DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TRIDENT ONE SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE. AND UNLESS AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON NEW WEAPONS, PENTAGON COULD BUILD MX MISSILE, BRADSHER SAID, ADDING IT WOULD PERMIT SOVIET UNION TO CONTINUE TRYING TO MATCH U.S. WARHEAD ACCURACY, DEPLOY ITS NEW SS-NS-18 SUBMARINE MISSILE, DEPLOY SS-16 MOBILE MISSILE. "WHAT IT WOULD DO TO NEXT GENERATION OF SOVIET MISSILES NOW UNDER DEVELOPMENT IS NOT YET DECIDED," BRADSHER CONTINUED. "U.S. NEGOTIATORS," HE SAID, "STILL HOPE TO TIGHTEN TERMS OF NEW TREATY BEFORE IT IS CONCLUDED. BUT PRESENT SOVIET DETERMINATION TO RESIST

ANY CHECKS ON CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR STRATEGIC ARSENAL LEAVES POSSIBILITY THAT ADMINISTRATION WILL FAIL IN ITS BASIC POLICY AIM FOR SALT.... ASIDE FROM SOVIET REFUSAL TO AGREE ON MODERNIZATION HALT, THERE HAS BEEN PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF POLICING ANY AGREEMENT. WHILE IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO COUNT SILOS, SUBMARINES AND BOMBERS WITH RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES AND THUS VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH SALT ONE, AND WOULD BE SIMILARLY POSSIBLE TO CHECK ON VLADIVOSTOK TERMS, PHOTOS FROM SPACE DO NOT SHOW WHETHER UNCLASSIFIED

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WARHEAD GUIDANCE HAS BEEN IMPROVED. INFORMED SOURCES SAY DEFINITION OF 'NEW WEAPONS' HAS PROVED STUMBLING BLOCK IN U.S. EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE BAN ON THEM. U.S. IS STILL TRYING TO PREVENT INTRODUCTION OF COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TYPES OF MISSILES, FOR INSTANCE, BUT THIS IS HARD TO PIN DOWN." HE EXPLAINED MOBILE MISSILES ARE BEING CONSIDERED AS NEW. U.S. HAS NOT YET BUILT ITS MX MISSILE OR ANY OTHER MOBILE TYPE. SOVIETS HAVE TESTED SS-16 INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILE BUT ARE NOT KNOWN TO HAVE DEPLOYED IT YET. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, DEPLOYED MOBILE SS-20 MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE, APPARENTLY DESIGNED FOR POSSIBLE USE AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE OR CHINA, BRADSHER SAID. "BUT U.S. ANALYSTS WORRY THAT IT IS SIMPLY FIRST TWO SECTIONS, OR STAGES, OF SS-16 AND COULD EASILY BE TURNED INTO AN INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPON BY ADDING THIRD STAGE." BRADSHER SAID "SOVIET EFFORTS TO RESTRICT CRUISE MISSILES AND U.S. EFFORTS TO CONTROL BACKFIRE WERE MAIN OBSTACLES TO TURNING VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT INTO SALT TWO TREATY DURING FORD ADMINISTRATION. COMPROMISES ON THEM NOW EMERGING ARE, SOME SOURCES SAY, KIND THAT COULD HAVE ARRANGED LAST YEAR. THEY WERE REFUSED BY THEN-PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF SENSITIVITY TO PENTAGON AND CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM OF THEM IN AN ELECTION YEAR."

3. WRITING IN OCT. 15 WASHINGTON POST, MURREY MARDER REPORTED ON SECRETARY VANCE'S THREE-HOUR MEETING LAST FRIDAY WITH JACKSON SUBCOMMITTEE. MARDER SAID JACKSON LATER USED MILD "RELATIVELY MILD LANGUAGE IN DESCRIBING SENATORIAL 'CONCERNS' AND 'DIFFERENCES.' BUT BY TIME JACKSON FINISHED LISTING DISAGREEMENTS TO REPORTERS, THEY WERE VAST. THEY COVERED VIRTUALLY ENTIRE RANGE OF COMPROMISES THAT PRESIDENT CARTER SAID HAVE NOW BROUGHT U.S. AND SOVIET UNION 'WITHIN SIGHT' OF AN AGREEMENT." JACKSON, ACCORDING UNCLASSIFIED

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TO MARDER, SAID "OUR CONCERNS RELATE TO THREAT TO OUR MINUTEMAN MISSILE FORCE, TO CRUISE MISSILE." LATER JACKSON ADDED TO "SEA-BASED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS" AND TO ADEQUACY OF RESTRICTIONS ON BACKFIRE. IN ADDITION, JACKSON EXL

PLAINED, THERE IS "AN ENORMOUS PROBLEM THAT REMAINS" ON HOW TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENT. AS RESULT, JACKSON SAID, "I THINK THERE ARE NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES THAT HAVE TO BE RESOLVED." MARDER SAID "STRONGEST COMPLIANT" IN SUBCOMMITTEE'S HEARING WAS OVER LACK OF CONSULTATION BY ADMINISTRATION ON ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION. VANCE, HE SAID, ACKNOWLEDGED NEED FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION. MARDER SAID VANCE AGREED AFTER DISCUSSION WITH BYRD, BAKER AND OTHERS TO RETURN FOR FURTHER TESTIMONY THIS WEEK, AND TO MEET ABOUT EVERY TWO WEEKS WITH THIS GROUP, IN ADDITION TO REGULAR CONSULTATIONS WITH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. JACKSON SAID "WE ARE GOING TO TRY TO REGULARIZE AN ARRANGEMENT BY WHICH WE CAN BE KEPT CURRENTLY INFORMED, DAY-TO-DAY, OR WEEK-TO-WEEK AS SITUATION MIGHT ARISE IN FUTURE." VANCE TOLD REPORTERS HE FULLY AGREED THAT IT IS "EXTREMELY IMPORTANT" TO INTENSIFY CONSULTATIONS. MARDER REPORTED THAT "THIS MEANS, INFORMED SOURCES SAID, THAT CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS NOW BOUND TO SENATE CONSULTATIONS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO SLOW DOWN ITS NEGOTIATIONS ALTERNATELY WITH SENATE AND WITH RUSSIANS." MARDER ALSO SAID "CARTER ADMINISTRATION MAINTAINS THAT ON BALANCE, PROJECTED SALT ACCORD WILL REPRESENT BETTER AGREEMENT THAN ANYONE ANTICIPATED DURING NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED IN 1974, 1975 OR 1976 -- ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY FAR SHORT OF CARTER'S ORIGINAL GOALS. AN ADMINISTRATION SOURCE SAID YESTERDAY 'WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO THROTTLE DOWN' NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS KNOWN AS SALT TWO, AND 'STILL HAVE OPTIONS OPEN TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY,' AND THEN BARGAIN FOR GREATER ADVANCES IN SALT THREE. SEARCH FOR 'AN IDEAL AGREEMENT,' HE SAID, SHOULD NOT BE AT EXPENSE OF ACHIEVING ATTAINABLE GOALS."

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4. HENRY TREWHITT OF BALTIMORE SUN REPORTED OCT. 17 THAT CARTER ADMINISTRATION SHIFTED ITS PUBLIC ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES, SAYING NUMBER OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THEIR POWER. FOR THAT REASON, SECRETARY VANCE TOLD INTERVIEWERS, MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF PROSPECTIVE NEW SALT AGREEMENT WILL BE LIMITS ON MISSILES WITH MORE THAN ONE WARHEAD. IMPORTANT, BUT LESS IMPORTANT, VANCE ADDED, WILL BE LIMITS ON SO-CALLED HEAVY MISSILES WITH GIANT WARHEADS. TREWHITT SAID "THIS, IN EFFECT, IS CHANGE IN RECENT PUBLIC EMPHASIS, WHICH HAS BEEN ON HEAVY MISSILES. LIMITS ON MULTIPLE WARHEADS HAVE BEEN TREATED AS MORE OR LESS SETTLED. BUT ADMINISTRATION IS KNOWN TO HAVE ABANDONED EFFORTS TO HAVE RUSSIAN HEAVY MISSILE, TO CONSTERNATION OF STRATEGISTS WORRIED ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITY." TREWHITT, SAID VANCE, APPEARING ON "MEET THE PRESS," DENIED ADMINISTRATION, OUT OF FRUSTRATION, HAD SOFTENED ITS POLICIES ON ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIDDLE EAST. REGARDING ARMS CONTROL, VANCE SAID CURRENT

NEGOTIATIONS MAY PRODUCE NEW SALT PACT IN "NEAR FUTURE."
VANCE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ADMINISTRATION HAS DIFFICULT TIME
AHEAD IN CONGRESS ABOUT SALT AND OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES.

5. AMERICAN PAPERS PICKED UP UPI AND AP DISPATCHES FROM
MOSCOW QUOTING PRAVDA AS SAYING U.S. AND USSR HAVE DRAWN
CLOSER TO CURBING NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND ARE "ON ROAD" TO
NEW SALT ACCORD. PRAVDA SAID "NOT ALL QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN
SOLVED, BUT THEY UNDOUBTEDLY CAN BE SOLVED IF ONE IS
GUIDED BY INTERESTS OF PEACE AND ADHERENCE TO PRINCIPLES
OF EQUAL SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES."

6. WILLIAM BEECHER, WRITING IN OCT. 14 BOSTON GLOBE,
SAID "YOU HAVE TO READ BETWEEN LINES OF BRIEF REUTER'S
REPORT FROM GENEVA ON TUESDAY TO GRASP ITS POTENTIAL SIGNI-
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FICANCE. IT QUOTED PAUL WARNKE AS SAYING NEGOTIATIONS HAD
BEGUN PREVIOUS DAY WITH SOVIET SALT DELEGATE VLADIMIR
SEMENOV 'TRANSLATING INTO TREATY FORM' ISSUES ADDRESSED
COUPLE OF WEEKS EARLIER BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND SOVIET
FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO. WARNKE TOLD NEWS CONFER-
ENCE THAT IN HIS VIEW SALT TWO TREATY MIGHT BE SEWED UP IN
'RELATIVELY FEW MONTHS.' THOSE WHO KNOW WARNKE, DIRECTOR
OF ACDA, MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO DISCOUNT THIS A TAD, SINCE
HE IS AN IRREPRESSIBLE OPTIMIST. THEY MIGHT, THAT IS,
EXCEPT FOR TWOPIECESOF INFORMATION NOT WIDELY KNOWN.
FIRST, BOTH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON APPEAR TO HAVE MADE
POLITICAL DECISION TO PRESS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE FOR
TREATY SINCE, FOR FIRST TIME IN CHECKERED HISTORY OF SALT,
THEY HAVE BUCKED DOWN FROM POLICY TO TECHNICAL LEVEL WHOLE
ARRAY OF SALT ISSUES -- BOTH THOSE AGREED ON IN GENERAL
TERMS AND SOME NOT SETTLED AT ALL. SECOND, SEMENOV QUI-
ETLY RUSHED BACK TO MOSCOW TO GET SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS,
PRESUMABLY TO FIND OUT WHETHER HE WOULD BE ALLOWED
ENOUGH LATITUDE TO TENTATIVELY DISPOSE OF ALL REMAINING
SALT ISSUES. FACT THAT WARNKE SOUNDED HIS OPTIMISTIC
FORECAST AFTER DAY OF INTENSE BARGAINING STRONGLY SUGGESTS
THAT SEMENOV WAS GIVEN UNPRECEDENTED LICENCE TO NEGOTI-
TATE BROAD ISSUES, NOT JUST WORD-SMITHING QUESTIONS.
PROBLEMS DOUBTLESS WILL ARISE, PROBABLY REQUIRING AT LEAST
ONE MORE SESSION AT GROMYKO'S LEVEL. BUT IF HISTORY IS
ANY GUIDE, ONCE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP DECIDED IT'S TIME FOR
AN AGREEMENT, SUBSTANTIVE MOUNTAINS CAN SUDDENLY BECOME
MOLEHILLS."

7. WASHINGTON POST REPORTED OCT. 16 THAT OCT. 19-21
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION CONFERENCE IN
WASHINGTON IS FOLLOWUP OF MAY'S LONDON SUMMIT OF WESTERN
INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS AND WAS FIRST CALLED FOR BY PRESI-
DENT IN NUCLEAR POLICY STATEMENT APRIL 7.

8. WASHINGTON POST'S GEORGE WILSON REPORTED OCT. 17 THAT
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AIR FORCE FORMALLY REQUESTED DEFENSE CONTRACTORS TO SUBMIT DESIGNS WITH 45 DAYS FOR MX MISSILE. WILSON NOTED PRESIDENT HAS NOT MADE DECISION TO ADVANCE MX FROM ITS CURRENT PAPER DESIGN PHASE TO FLYING PROTOTYPE. "HE COULD POSTPONE THAT DECISION UNTIL NEXT YEAR BECAUSE THERE IS STILL MUCH PAPERWORK TO DO, INCLUDING EVALUATION OF COMPETING DESIGNS AIR FORCE HAS JUST REQUESTED." ALSO OCT. 16, POST REPORTED FROM MOSCOW THAT PRAVDA CALLED BROWN'S TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION TO DEVELOP MX MISSILE "DANGEROUS POLITICAL PROVOCATION" THAT RAISED NEW OBSTACLES TO SALT.

9. WASHINGTON STAR PUBLISHED OCT. 16 REPORT BY AP'S RICHARD E. MEYER ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S INTERVIEW WITH NEWSPAPER EDITORS AND BROADCAST NEWS DIRECTORS FROM AROUND U.S. IN WIDE-RANGING INTERVIEW, CARTER MADE THESE POINTS: "I THINK WE ARE APPROACHING SETTLEMENT WITH SOVIETS" ON SALT. IN ADDITION, "WE HAVE ALREADY GOTTEN GOOD, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, I BELIEVE, ASSURED" ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. "WE HAVE AN ADEQUATE MEANS FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS." U.S. SYSTEM FOR MONITORING COMPLIANCE IS "NOT PERFECT" BUT "WE DO NOT HAVE HANDICAP ... THAT EXCEED HANDICAP OF SOVIETS." VANCE

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